# CHAPTER 6

# "A Two-Way Process of Accommodation": Public Perceptions of Integration along the Migration-Mobility Continuum

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## Introduction

Despite decades of policy and academic focus, integration remains a contested and opaque concept. Yet in recent years with its promise of social cohesion and shared citizenship, it has obtained a morally privileged status in contrast to the political disenchantment now attached to multiculturalism. This chapter presents a case study on public perceptions of integration among migrants and nonmigrants in two cities within the European Union, Edinburgh and Stockholm. Despite the European Union's guidance within its Common Basic Principles for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals that "integration is a two-way process of accommodation by all migrants and residents of member states" (Council of the European Union 2004), there remains a stubborn focus on individual migrant competencies such as language attainment, employment, educational attainment, political participation, and citizenship, which is at best a partial reading of the dimensions outlined within the Brussels-led MIPEX initiative (Niessen et al. 2007). As a result, integration debates are now influenced by a proliferation of management information data, often coordinated by the EU. The emphasis on migrant's individual competencies is coupled with a paucity of

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evidence on public perceptions of integration and little understanding of how they are influencing policy.

In investigating the role of public perceptions in the politics of migration, the case study presented here addresses this gap. The aim is not merely to complicate understandings of integration and its ongoing construction but rather to reveal that it is perfectly possible to work with diverse conceptualizations of integration among a segmented public. The findings presented here challenge a common perception of an anti-immigration public often based on assumptions of xenophobic atavistic tendencies or secondary sources such as media representations.

It is worth stating at the outset that there is a wealth of literature on people's attitudes toward different categories of migrants and their integration such as the work of Bogardus on social distance scaling (1933) and within acculturation studies (Berry 2006). Yet there is a relative paucity of research that examines public understandings of the integration concept itself. Analysts who want to go beyond media representations of public opinion must rely on a small number of questions in public opinion surveys. There is also virtually no research into nonmigrants' understandings of their own integration. Even well-meaning actors can resort to ideal-type notions of integration that require migrants to live up to imagined ideals of integration. A notable exception is McPherson's Foucauldian discourse analysis of the normative nature of integration within the Australian context: she questions "how integrationism has come to saturate twenty-first century migration policy discourse and demonstrates how integration has become understood as the helping hand of civilisation to 'lesser' outsiders" (McPherson 2010: 551–552).

Public debate around integration plays a decisive role in the framing of policy agendas. This chapter introduces a dialogical analysis, concerned not only with the processes by which people creatively rework social knowledge to develop their positions, but also the movement of such social knowledge between the everyday communicative public sphere of reasoning and debate and the coordinative public sphere of policy actors. Social knowledge or discourse formation is understood as existing in the form of communicative social representations that exist between the self and the issue or object under discussion (Jovchelovitch 2007: 34). A two-way flow is assumed, with members of the public influenced by hegemonic representations (Moscovici 1990) and the institutions engaged in policy development equally porous to public discourse in what Schmidt terms discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2010: 3).

Two distinct steps are taken within the chapter to understand integration in dialogical terms. The opening step provides an illustration of a dialogical approach introducing fieldwork extracts; this is followed by social psychological understandings of integration centered on fourfold acculturation accounts relating to contact between minority and majority cultures (Berry 1990, 2006). The chapter then introduces a relatively new dialogical approach that represents a departure from acculturation accounts. The public, within this approach, are understood as having the dialogical capacities to enact, reason, and debate. Further and equally public discourse, including the use of concepts such as integration, is understood as containing the voices of others and being orientated toward a segmented audience. The introduction of this new theoretical framing is followed by a brief account of the Europeanization of immigration that serves to frame the fieldwork itself within the key policy context.

It is the *10-point migration-mobility continuum* that is at the heart of the analysis presented below and this is set out in the middle of the chapter. The continuum (see figure 6.1) is not a taxonomical account of mobility, but an analytical framework taking a seemingly black-and-white oppositional binary "migrant/nonmigrant" and refracting this into a spectrum of differing, but continuous mobility positions through the prism of the




**Figure 6.1** The 10-Point Migration-Mobility Continuum.
*Source*: Mahendran 2013.

individual's autobiographical "mobility position." This analytical device reveals a more distributed account of how integration is constructed and enacted among the public.

The empirical analysis presented in the second half of the chapter will demonstrate a variety of position on integration. An appreciation of the diversity of positions on integration within public perceptions needs to be countered by an awareness that public reasoning is socially and culturally mediated (Haste and Abrahams 2008). Social actors are collectively influenced by dominant macro narratives or hegemonic social representations—often understood as an unquestioned "common" sense—that circulate within the European public sphere. This is particularly evident in the current 'moral privileging' (Bowskill, Lyons, and Coyle 2007; McPherson 2010) of integration across Europe that often finds its concrete focus, as will be demonstrated, in an emphasis on national language acquisition.

Finally, the chapter will tackle an inherent paradox within current integration agendas that integration itself, as McPherson (2010) explains, necessarily constructs a problem migrant that is in need of integration. Such agendas do not countenance the alternative possibilities that integration is either unnecessary or occurs naturally through processes of settlement. In drawing together the findings of the analysis, this chapter will consider how the construction of a problem migrant often rests on a conflation between ethno-religious categorization and mobility.

## Toward a Dialogical Analysis of Integration

There is a long tradition, particularly within social psychology, of asking individuals to make judgments about migrant groups that points to the origins of the conflation of migration with ethnic category within social research that will be returned to later in the chapter. For example, in Bogardus's seminal hierarchical 7-point social distance scale, participants were asked to judge whether they would choose, to marry into the group (1), have them as next-door neighbors (3), or bar from the nation (7) (1933). This narrow focus on decontextualized individual judgment is unable to appreciate that such judgments are culturally embedded (Weinfurt and Moghaddam 2001).

Dialogical approaches, drawing from the work of Russian ethical philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, move away from the isolated individual making judgments and toward the notions of the relational self and "being as an event" (Bakhtin, Holquist, and Liapunov 1993: 2). Today

dialogical approaches place varying degrees of emphasis on the culturally embedded self and its dialogue with social knowledge in the public sphere. A distinct line of inquiry examines the processes by which social representations in the public sphere are agentically used by individuals who are understood as having dialogical capacities termed "dialogicality" (Jovchelovitch 2007; Marková 2003). A second line of inquiry has extended Bakhtin's dialogical self into a repertoire of *I*-positions (Hermans 2001; Raggatt 2007, 2012) or works with a series of three key emotional-volitional interactions within the dialogical self "I-for myself, the other-for-me and I-for the other" (Bakhtin, Holquist, and Liapunov 1993: 54; Sullivan 2007, 2011).

The dialogical approach taken here combines the traditions above and develops a distinct route to understanding public perceptions of integration that goes further into both the public's ability to reason through a variety of positions and the public's use of social knowledge in arriving at a perception. In the next section this conceptualization of the individual's dialogical capacity is developed in more detail drawing a little from the empirical analysis that underpins this case study.

### *Public Perception as Dialogical Capacity*

The central proposition of the analysis presented here is that dialogicality is an inherent feature of our capacities as culturally embedded individuals. Marková understands dialogicality as the "capacity to conceive, create and communicate about social realities in terms of otherness" (2003: 91). This perspective alters the framing of the understanding of public perceptions of integration. The appropriate question is no longer what the public understands by integration or thinks about the integration of certain groups of migrants. The question becomes what are the relational processes by which the public coauthors the production of discourse about integration. Key features of the dialogue to analyze are who are the others authored in the public's talk, who are the people or institutions the talk addresses, and what shared social knowledge is being used to sustain the dialogue.

Social positioning by others can be delineated from the individual's dialogical ability to take up positions. Working with Bakhtin's notion of the dialogical self and Mead's relational self, Hermans outlined the self as having a positioning repertoire. This includes internal *I*-positions such as "I as refugee" or "I as engineer," and external *I*-positions, relating to another subject position; for example, "as my father often used to say, we are all migrants." By using external *I*-positions when we talk,

we effectively "author" another person often for rhetorical, polemical, or empathic purposes (Hermans and Dimaggio 2007; Hermans 2001; Hermans and Gieser 2012; Raggatt 2007, 2012).

The key delineation between different positional planes within the theoretical parameters of this case study is between the external position of where the person is placed on the *migration-mobility continuum* detailed below and the positioning inherent to a dialogical capacity to debate using the social knowledge available. Though it may seem a little early to enter the field, it is worth illustrating the interplay between subject positions on the migration-mobility continuum and how members of the public use social knowledge from the communicative public sphere in their dialogical positioning. Consider the following extract.[1]

**Extract 1**

*KM*: Would you say you feel a part of the city?

*NA*: Not really. I was born here, I went to school here, but I guess, I mean, like you said, I could have chosen not to come back to Edinburgh. I could have gone on from London to live somewhere else. You know, I quite like (the) city, there's a lot of things happening.

*KM*: So why is it that you say you don't feel part of the city?

*NA*[2]: (4) I don't really feel a part of anything other than living on this planet. (KM: That's interesting) (3) I've got family ties here. Memories probably, and going to work and, I suppose maybe my trip to South America I had a bit of culture (shock) going there for six months. Coming back to and during my time in South America I realized there was another equally beautifully culture somewhere else in the world, and I suppose every country has its own beauty and its own culture. I certainly felt the atmosphere in Chile and enjoyed it, enjoyed being in another culture. Someone thought I was Chilean because I lived like other people. (Edinburgh, Nonmigrant 4, "NA")

Born in Edinburgh, NA, is a nonmigrant who lived in Chile for six months and London for six years before returning to Edinburgh. OU left Chile as a child for Venezuela settling in Stockholm in 1987 as a refugee. He offers his account of integration.

**Extract 2**

*NM*[3]: If we turn then to integration (2) do you feel a part of Stockholm, do you feel integrated?

*OU*: Spontaneously I want to answer that I work, I can speak the language, but I notice that there exists an idea amongst Swedes that

> being integrated means becoming Swedish and I think that's wrong, not that I think they can't think like that, they can think what they like, but I think it is wrong. But it's like all migrants are meant to lose their identity and being Swedish is the only way to be and acting like a Swede is the only way to be approved. I think that is like well you notice that certain people think that, you haven't integrated because you are not Swedish enough, they think being integrated is taking the Swedish side in an argument, but integration doesn't have to involve that. First thing is the language, yes, and work, but identity, that you should be able to keep, otherwise it is an oppressive society, culture if you start to get a feeling that you have to adapt and act like a Swede in order to be accepted. But unfortunately it has become that way. (Stockholm, Migrant 4, "OU")

NA and OU are in position 4 and position 8 respectively on the migration-mobility continuum. When asked whether they feel integrated, they demonstrate a dilemmatic form of thinking constructing a series of positions sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory, enabling them to work through their conceptualizations, resist potentially stigmatizing discursive positions, and rework or employ alternative positions. They draw, in part, from discourses and social representations within the public sphere, "to work, to speak the language," combining these with imagined positions of others in relation to their differing contexts: "I notice there exists an idea amongst Swedes," leading to what Bakhtin understood as the *multivoicedness* contained within people's talk (Bakhtin and Holquist 1981).

OU's perceptions of integration reveal the social actions inherent in dialogue, for OU there is an expectation that integration is enacted as taking "the Swedish side in an argument." This then is partly a question of what can be intersubjectively agreed. Perhaps his categorization of the Swedish position is misplaced (Gillespie and Cornish 2009). However, as we will see below, where a number of people begin to utilize or resist the same social knowledge drawn from the public sphere, this suggests that a social representation is at work (Howarth 2006).

Social representations refer to the socially shared knowledge that exists to make the unfamiliar, often scientific or ideological knowledge, more familiar. Moscovici developing this approach in the 1950s wanted to emphasize that people were not entirely susceptible or irrational rather they thought rationally in ways that could be understood by scientists. Common-sense thinking becomes the "autonomous third genre of thinking," between scientific thinking and ideological thinking (Moscovici and Duveen 2000: 237–240).

OU sets up a canonical individualized form of integration, to learn the language, to get a job, and orientates himself away from this in an anticanonical direction; this rhetorical positional move works to resist a generalized call for assimilation and points to a more multicultural or cosmopolitan idea of integration. NA also resists the concept and its connotations, despite being born in Edinburgh; in an existential rhetorical move he detaches himself from city-level belonging and later draws attention to being taken as a Chilean to implicitly suggest perhaps that he is capable of adapting and assimilating into another culture. NA would be understood as a "native" or nonmigrant in the majority of public opinion surveys; here, however, in a more distributed approach to public perceptions, he is placed, as noted, in position 4 of the *migration-mobility continuum* (see figure 6.1), the returnee position. He uses his experiences in London and Chile to construct his resistant position on integration.

The dialogical capacities illustrated in the extracts above are not just the preserve of ordinary members of the public in the communicative public sphere. They are equally evident in the thinking of analysts making sense of a given public concern, or policymakers working within the ideological constraints of a more coordinative public sphere to frame up and progress policy programs. The next section considers how understanding people's dialogical capacities can inform an understanding of acculturation.

### *Integration: From Acculturation Theory to a Dialogical Approach*

Building on Lewin's fourfold theory of acculturation that had balanced cultural chauvinism against divided loyalties, social psychological understandings of integration have focused less on migrants getting a job or learning the language and more on the extent to which individuals engage in contact with other "dominant" groups termed "acculturation" (1948). Berry's seminal and ongoing program into acculturation strategies (1990) distinguishes between "assimilation," where an individual's contact with their own group is decreased in favor of the dominant group, "integration," where the individual is able to engage in contact with the dominant group without losing cultural contact with their own group. This is contrasted with "separation" where loyalty with one's own culture leads the individual to reject contact with other more dominant groups and finally "marginalization" where the person fails to make contact with other groups but also loses contact with their original cultural group. It is hard to escape the conclusion that this is a

normative account where the strategies of assimilation, separation, and marginalization are viewed as less desirable than integration.

Berry's account has been subject to a number of revisions, not least because of increasing appreciation that this was not solely a question of individual decision making but affected by the national and local political strategies and the very social knowledge discussed above. In response Berry developed acculturation to consider mutual ethnic relations (2006) as well as globalization where at the macro level the fourfold taxonomy becomes a melting pot, multiculturalism, exclusion, and segregation respectively (Berry 2008: 332). Van Oudenhoven et al. innovatively extend acculturation theory to offer a more perceptual account that included both migrant and nonmigrant perceptions of the four strategies. They notice a "discrepancy of perceptions" where Turkish and Moroccan migrants said they would favor integration when presented with each of the four strategies within a fictitious newspaper article, whereas Dutch people favored assimilation. Critically the Dutch participants believed both Moroccans and Turkish people to favor separation (1998: 1010–1011).

The parameters of acculturation theory have come under critique, particularly its lack of definitional clarity, one-dimensional focus on contact, and its current inability to understand each strategy as ipsative, that is, the possibility of being marginalized in one context and integrated in another. More trenchant criticism points to the focus on one-way cultural learning by the minority ethnic migrant (Deaux 2006; Rudmin 2003). The lack of focus on nonmigrants inherent to existing acculturation accounts risks failing to appreciate the idea that nonmigrants are also acculturating and learning from their own travels, contact with migrant groups, and other sources of social knowledge in the public sphere.

There is a growing trend among social and political psychologists to understand integration in more discursive terms. Howarth et al. have critiqued acculturation theory's treatment of culture and identity as discrete entities. They demonstrate how people use oppositional themes such as "cultural maintenance versus cultural contact" or "identity versus exclusion" that they term "acculturation in movement" from context to context (2013). Bowskill, Lyons, and Coyle, taking a critical discursive approach, explore the way integration is constructed and the function it serves in media debates about state-funded faith schools. They demonstrate that the moral privileging of integration serves to give it the "rhetorical weight of common sense" where it becomes understood as the "optimal response to diversity," that is, self-evident social reality

(2007). The maintenance of segregation within a particular context, that is, the desire to educate a child in a single-faith school, particularly when it is a Muslim school, is socially positioned, within media representations, as transgressive.

Dialogical studies into integration that are less concerned with discursive knowledge have, as noted, tended to focus on the dialogical self. Bhatia details the *I*-positional processes that migrants are engaged in when navigating transnationally between the positionings and possibilities of their new homes and their countries of origin. The strength of Bhatia's use of the dialogical self is that it allows the migrant to be capable of feeling at once assimilated, separated, and marginalized (2002). Furthermore, Buitelaar relates these strategies to Moroccan migrants within the Netherlands (2006). The approach developed here builds on social representation approaches outlined above and extends understandings of the dialogical self. Rather than focus on the subjective understandings of the migrant, the analysis outlined below understands dialogue at four levels—(1) the subjective level of the multivoiced dialogical self and its *I*-positions; (2) the face-to-face dialogue and the framings that occur; (3) the dialogics of words in use (Mahendran 2003: 240); and (4) finally, the dialogue between the individual as social actor and the social knowledge located within the public sphere in the form of social representations. Complete accounts of the four-level dialogical analysis can be found in (Mahendran 2003, 2011).

## Framing the Case Study within the European Policy Context

The European Union plays an increasing role in immigration policies where progressive treaties have facilitated the movement of citizens. The EU sees itself as providing leadership and support in relation to a common agenda for the management of migration flows and the integration of migrants. This does not always sit easily with countries whose colonial histories have formed the basis of their immigration, such as UK, or have a long history of policies on immigrant integration, such as Sweden; nevertheless, such processes exert a decisive influence in what has been termed the Europeanization of immigration (Faist and Ette 2007).

### *Mobility as Freedom and Threat*

The changing parameters of successive treaties—particularly the freedom of movement of member state citizens since the Maastricht Treaty

1992, the take-up of these freedoms by citizens of new accession countries, and the development of integration priorities in policy programs such as Lisbon, Hague, and Stockholm—have led to new terms of reference in integration debates. A tension is created between the increased opportunity for EU citizens to move between member states—mobility as freedom, and European Union policies that see only non-EU nationals as the focus of integration policies—mobility as threat. Though certain EU citizens can become the stigmatized focus of EU policy, for example, Roma people, generally EU citizens are increasingly sharply delineated from non-EU citizens, as not presenting integration concerns to member states, because they are protected by certain rights and are perceived, in social and cultural terms, as "also European." This sharp distinction between the EU and non-EU citizen risks creating a discursive frame that ignores member states own unique histories of immigration flows that are not based on such a distinction.

In what is generally termed the securitization of immigration, integration of non-EU immigrants often builds on fears around ethno-religious communitarian activities, where a tension builds between European Union aspirations around European citizenship and freedom of mobility, and ideas of integration and belonging within the European Union project (Aradau, Huysmans, and Squire 2010; Collett 2006). Though liberal accounts of integration point to its *two-way* nature, this tends to be understood as an individual's integration attempts being assisted by the efforts of residents, institutions, and agencies. The focus on civic integration relating to early settlement processes, acquisition of national language, knowledge of social norms, and a country's history and institutions has been widely commented on (Joppke 2007) and it is worth noting its parallels to the academic literature on acculturation theory.

## Case Selection and Methodology

The two capital cities of Edinburgh and Stockholm provide quite different contexts for integration in debate; Scotland, though not an EU member state, since devolution in 1998, has developed a distinct discourse around immigration that found expression in an active promotion of immigration originally under its "Fresh Talent" initiative that began in 2003. Integration, settlement, and retention are devolved policies and Scotland's approach to integration is distinct within the UK, in talking of integration from day one with respect to asylum seekers. Sweden, by contrast, has a very long history in developing integration policy that originally was based around a moral compact emphasizing compassion

and solidarity. Until very recently, the migrant was invariably understood as a refugee. Earlier migrations of the Finnish have slipped from collective memory, and current migration between Nordic countries because of the possibilities inherent in Nordic citizenship are not the subject of integration policy. In their seminal "paradoxes of multiculturalism," Ålund and Schierup point to an increasing emphasis on the migrant as culturally different they argue that "'the moral compact on which Swedish integration policy is built, is gradually disintegrating, giving way to a culturalist construction of new discriminatory boundaries" (1991: 10). Though national policies were not explicitly used to frame the study, such shifting political contexts undoubtedly will influence the social knowledge embedded in the two respective polities where Scotland is a relative newcomer to integration policies and Sweden has one of the longest histories of integration policy in Europe.

The Dialogues on Migration, Citizenship, and Integration (D-MIC) case study was carried out from 2007 to 2009 and used the European Union's Hague Program as its explicit frame: 32 people participated in the study, 24 interviews and 4 focus groups were conducted in Stockholm and Edinburgh. Participants were selected through advertisement in adult education colleges and through chain sampling. The basic eligibility was living in either of the two cities. There were an equal number of males and females in the interviews. The age range of participants was from 18 to 60 years: 24 participants took part in the interviews; 13 participants took part in the focus groups, among whom 7 had already participated in interviews. The aim was to have sufficient sample size to shed light on the variety of differing positions, understandings, and arguments around integration among the public and the shared social knowledge that is being utilized within these. Participants were selected to represent a variety of educational levels ranging from leaving school after primary school to postgraduate level, and including people from a range of occupations including four students and one person who was unemployed. Participants were asked to discuss their own mobility, integration, and citizenship. In the second half of the interviews and throughout the focus groups, EU stimulus materials, such as the integration priority within the Hague program and the Common Basic Principles, were used to elicit discussion on mobility within Europe, EU integration policy, and the concept of European citizenship.

The approach of giving policy stimulus materials to participants in order to elicit debate on integration was partly inspired by deliberative democracy approaches such as citizen panels and citizen juries. Participants were not required to reach an agreement; however, they were positioned, in part, as citizens rather than just asked to "tell their

mobility story." As Davies, Wetherell, and Barnett explain, "to address a 'citizen' is to imagine a more active actor, integrated into a polity and participating in collective decisions about what is to be done" (2006: 2).

## Analysis: Integration along the Migration-Mobility Continuum

Public perceptions of integration are segmented in the analysis below according to key positions on the 10-point migration-mobility continuum. The 10 positions along the migration-mobility continuum (figure 6.1) arose out of the first phase of analysis when participants discussing integration drew on a degree of mobility as their starting point. As the account of dialogical approaches indicates, these are dynamic relational positions, rather than static positions or bureaucratic types. The individual can move positions according to their individual circumstances, becoming more or less settled as time passes. It is also worth returning to the delineation at the start of this chapter between the *I*-positional capacity to speak from a variety of positions when in debate, and position on the migration-mobility continuum where inevitably there is a degree of fixity.

### *Nonmobility and Integration*

The first position on the continuum is associated with generational nonmobility. Here the individual remains living in the country they were born in. It is this position that commentators or analysts often have in mind when they talk of the nonmigrant or the dominant group. Such participants may see themselves as unambiguously integrated into their communities. Consider, for example, the comment by QP.

**Extract 3**

*NM*: If we turn now to integration, do you feel integrated in Stockholm?
*QP*: yeh. I think so
*NM*: In what way?
*QP*: In what way do I feel at home here do you mean?
*NM*: yeh are you a real *08*?
*QP*: *yeh about as 08 as you can be* since I've lived here all my life I feel very at home here. I would say I'm absolutely a Stockholmer. I don't know what you could call me otherwise. There aren't any other alternatives for what I can be =
*NM*: =no. Okay
*QP*: I feel a part of Stockholm. (Stockholm, Nonmigrant 3, "QP")

It is worth noting that such a position does not necessarily assume a certain outlook toward the integration of migrants. It may be the position associated with an anti-immigration position, within media representations, but equally it can be the basis for an alternative public perception. Here QP takes up the issue of the "two-way process of accommodation."

**Extract 4**

*NM*: Okay if you look at number one here integration as a dynamic mutual process how do you perceive that? Do you agree with it or =

*QP*: = no I don't really (NM: You don't?) *no I don't think so* (NM *no*) no it depends on how you see it. I mean you have to break it up into different parts really (2) I have to always relate these things back to myself. If I was to come to another country and I was to come there then I wouldn't think that this process is a two-way process in the beginning I would just think it should (be) me that receives I think I come there I get somewhere to live maybe I get an education maybe I get help financially for example so I manage everyday life for example. (Stockholm, Nonmigrant 3, "QP")

QP's perception of integration can be understood as a "hosting position." Putting himself in the position of the migrant arriving into Sweden, he understands integration as between the individual migrant and the institutions of the host country. The dialogue continues:

**Extract 5**

*NM*: so you would think that you should be entitled to those things in the beginning?

*QP*: yes I would think that I *should* get those things because that is how I myself has been like so to speak raised so that's how I value wise work so if you come here as a migrant and you get a bonus start . . . get help with accommodation and language courses and help maybe financially. First phase I would think that I should just receive and that wouldn't be a two-way process it would just be one-way to *me*. It takes a while before you get to where you need to be to be able get your own accommodation you have a job you can speak the language and got into the society socially as well then it can become a two way process. Then you'll win both can win the individual can win and society can (get) something out of it. (Stockholm, Nonmigrant 3, "QP")

Within this hosting position, Sweden or Stockholm, is placed as the provider who will ultimately benefit. Critically QP does not articulate a position in relation to any shifts or accommodations that need

to be made by him other than to support the existence of settlement processes. Another participant a former employability worker offers a further perception of integration.

**Extract 6**

*KM*: In the first box . . . it describes the integration of migrants as being a dynamic two-way process of accommodation. When you saw that, what did you think?

*MS*: One of the (4), I suppose criticisms (2) of let's say, the Muslim kids who came to Mansfield was that they . . . they would be befriend one another and they would spend time together and there often wasn't integration, and I can quite understand why that would be, because, it's, it's like (sticking to) somebody who speaks the same language as you. If somebody's life is similar to yours and familiar to you, it's so much more comfortable to be with that person. So often you will hear the criticism that "well, these Muslims don't want." There's one group to take as an example, don't want to integrate because they're quite comfortable in their own company and so on and I feel that (2) they're (2) pushed that way as much as they are pulling that way, you know, that there's comfort in it. But, there's often a need to take that comfort because they're feeling unwelcome or ostracised or whatever. (Edinburgh, Nonmigrant 3, "MS")

MS, having moved to Edinburgh from the north of Scotland, is in position 1 on the migration-mobility continuum. She combines rhetorical and empathetic dialogical *I*-positions, to understand separation, not as a less desirable acculturation strategy, or transgressive, but rather as a reasonable response to both social circumstances and a desire to mix with other children who are culturally familiar. MS makes use of an imagined generalized voice of the public. She does not take up the archetypal public position but uses this voice as a resource to make a nonarchetypal argument, demonstrating relative sophistication in unpacking the dominant narrative that one imagines the public has on migration and integration. Nevertheless, MS, when constructing the migrant she has in mind, conflates migration with ethno-cultural category and uses Muslim children as the subject of the debates on integration.

### *Migrant Descent Position: Language Acquisition in Debate*

In the second position, participants tend to draw on their migrant backgrounds to articulate a position around integration. Swedish nonmigrant

TT has a German mother and Swedish father. In discussing integration she commented:

**Extract 7**

*TT*: These migrants that have parents that can't speak the language (. . .). I have always lived with my mum and mum spoke German but mum had two language things that I think are really good, one she even stopped having an accent before I was even two or three or whatever it was, I know that she speaks even cleaner now than she did when I was really young, and even then you could barely hear it, you heard it on the tongue sometimes with U or O but otherwise you couldn't hear that she had another language during almost my whole 25 years, . . . she learnt to excuse my language she bloody wanted to learn because she was living in Sweden and she was going to stay here . . . if you are going to be part of the society then you have to learn the language. (Swedish, Nonmigrant 6, "TT")

TT describes herself as "not a normative Swede," saying "I think the German is always a part but I feel Swedish," she explains the problem further.

**Extract 8**

*TT*: If I have understood it correctly we have really bad options for learning the language and that is *only* Sweden's fault because we could do that a lot better, and this is frustrating for me because I have worked a lot in old peoples homes, care work a lot and met a lot of migrants that I have a hard time understanding what they mean and it's really frustrating but at the same time there isn't anyone else that would want to take those jobs [NM: No] so you end up in a work team where it's me and one other in a group of ten and all the rest have another ethnic background. (Swedish, Nonmigrant 6, "TT")

Here TT locates her account of integration within the workplace. Getting a job as noted earlier is, of course, one of the key common indicators of integration within Europe. However, TT reveals how the work place becomes the very site where integration is contested. In this one-way assimilationist account, integration is more than simply having a job; it involves the ability to speak to colleagues in the national language without any trace of another accent. TT participated in both the interview and the focus group; here she discusses how young people speak a transcultural language known as *blatte Svenska* (blatte[4] Swedish).

**Extract 9**

*TT*: The problem is also that you then get second generation migrants that can't speak the language they can only speak blatte Svenska (blatte Swedish) which is a language that is developing all the time (6)

*BC*: Talking of blatte Svenska that's those in my age that go to school and they don't care about learning the language that's what I think [TT: Exactly]

*BC*: They don't care about learning Swedish, they just want to use blatte Svenska

*TT*: "I don't want to learn your language I want to speak my language" [BC: yes exactly]

*KB*: I actually think that if I don't bother learning the language then I am just going to be a burden but if I learn then I can apply for a job and then you are going to learn a lot more as well. (Stockholm, Focus Group 3—February 2008. Response to newspaper article, Dagens Nyheter [2008])

This illustrates a public perception that uses one's own migrant descent to build an argument for national language acquisition among those also of migrant descent. Learning the language is totemic in integration debates and occurs right across the continuum; its importance is mentioned in all the interviews and focus groups. Perhaps this is not entirely a question of its practical importance within a new country. It suggests a common view of a resistant separation by maintaining one's own language or creating new transcultural languages. This relates less to position along the continuum and is better understood as existing within an underlying social representation at work in the public sphere—a social representation of cohesion.

KB, a migrant who also participated in the focus group, turns the discussion toward the potential mutuality in language acquisition ending "then you are going to learn a lot more as well," suggesting that cultural diversity may have potential benefits. Again a problem migrant is being constructed, which relates to particular cultural ethno-religious categorization. Particular groups of migrants and their descendants sometimes referred to, in some European contexts, as second generation *migrants* or third generation *migrants* are discursively held separately, subordinated, and seen as the focus of integration efforts.

### *Returnee Position—Resisting the Integration Ideal*

In many ways, it is the returnee position, position 4, on the migration-mobility continuum, which led to the development of the continuum.

Participants such as NA (from extract 1), demonstrated their ambiguity toward integration and draw on an outsider perspective. BM, who has also lived abroad several times and then returned to Sweden, comments, when asked the question "are there times when you feel outside of the city?":

**Extract 10**

*BM*: I could find situation now where I'm single, I don't have children, I'm not married, I don't belong to the norms. The city (Stockholm) it is pretty and you think of people of being quite national and narrow-minded.
*KM*: What sort of things can you give me some ideas of what you mean?
*BM*: You're supposed to live suppose to be married at a certain age you suppose to have studied education and live in certain areas have certain cars (6) you're not suppose to be a foreigner you're not suppose to be (2) gay you're not suppose to be anything that is different.
*KM*: But you are a white Swedish woman so you.
*BM*: No I'm fortunate I could always get all these things and be accepted, it's not that I don't feel accepted that's not why. (Stockholm, Nonmigrant 2, "BM")

BM diffuses the debate on the integration of migrants by illustrating further potential categories of exclusion, such as being unmarried, unemployed, or gay. She draws from her own childhood mobility, to explain her position.

**Extract 11**

*KM*: But a-part of you doesn't like that?
*BM*: No I don't like it (1) I don't like the law.
*KM*: Why is that?
*BM*: (. . .) personally I think it's because I had quite a lot in childhood and I know how people be (2) on the outside and are excluded [KM: yeah] so I think I always feel for people not =
*KM*: = Being included in personal areas.
*BM*: Although I've never (1) I've never been (1) I have always been included with white upper class sorts of people. I feel I don't (1) I don't like it, I don't feel at home at all.
*KM*: And if you could magically redesign (1) Stockholm what would you do?
*BM*: I'd bring in different nationalities different sorts of people all ages. (Stockholm, Nonmigrant 2, "BM")

BM, just like KB, begins to draw on a social representation of mutually beneficial cultural diversity to challenge the emphasis on conformity inherent in integration discourse which positions conformity as central to social cohesion.

These four positions at the nonmobile end of the continuum demonstrate the heterogeneity of nonmigrant public perceptions of integration. Understandings of integration vary between an initial hosting position, assimilation, and separation as a reasonable acculturation strategy. Going further, participants in this case study, with some experience of temporary migration disavow the concept and its ideals in favor of cosmopolitanism or multiculturalism.

### *Mobile Positions: Constructing the "Problem" Migrant*

In examining more mobile positions, perhaps the most striking distinction is between those that relate integration to themselves and those that construct a problem migrant. OU, in position 8 as a settled serial migrant, illustrates the relational challenges of integration (see extract 2), he challenges integration, in the Swedish context, as a pressure to assimilate pointing to the importance of maintaining one's own cultural identities. In contrast, BE, an American academic also in position 8, supports the idea of the migrant demonstrating an adaptive acculturation strategy.

**Extract 12**

*BE*: And when I read that (referring to the EU's two-way principle), I wrote a little note here thinking—actually, I never really thought of it as a two-way so much. Or if it is a two-way process, there is much more responsibility on my part, to get along with local rules and customs and cultures, than for the Scottish people to adjust to make my life easier. (Edinburgh, Migrant 6, "BE")

TY and OU, in position 10 and 9 respectively, reveal one of the more intriguing and revealing findings in the analysis. Here they discuss why integration has become a political issue.

**Extract 13**

*TY*: I mean first of all by trying to integrate someone you're automatically pointing them out as being different which, you know, might just make integrating them more difficult because you always have, you know, in a lot of communities, in Germany for example, because

> Turkish workers came en mass, you know, so it's very difficult to integrate them whereas where say, you know, Chinese workers came in dribbles. It was a lot easier to integrate them into the community. (Edinburgh, Migrant 2, "TY")

TY in position 10 is of mixed European origins: she has moved several times since childhood and anticipates moving again. OS, a Russian migrant in position 9, has moved several times and in her interview she explains that she is holding on to her Russian citizenship to allow for the possibility of returning to Russia to look after her elderly parents.

**Extract 15**

> *OS*: There were some many problems with integration and people don't integrate probably as good as countries would like and of course it's very difficult to integrate people from one for example different religious views it's-it's really difficult I mean looking to the Muslim community. Ahh well their traditions are very strong and of course I mean . . . often even children who are born in Sweden they are kind of more involved in the Muslim community than you know integrate into Swedish life. (Stockholm, Migrant 2, "OS"[5])

The more mobile end of the continuum demonstrates a heterogeneous and distributed set of perceptions of integration. When interviewed about integration, participants in position 8 relate the issue of integration to themselves, whereas nonsettled mobile positions assume that the discussion is *not* about them. However, there are risks in presuming their nonsettled positions are the principal reason for using such a distancing strategy.

## Discussion: New Understandings of Public Perceptions of Integration

The analysis presented within this case study extends accounts of the dialogical self (Bakhtin 1981; Hermans 2001) to the area of public perceptions demonstrating the value of understanding public perceptions of integration as distributed along a migration-mobility continuum. It is hopefully clear by now that it is possible to develop a nuanced understanding of public perceptions as segmented and distributed by combining an analytical device such as the continuum with an understanding of the role of discourse formation or social representations circulating within the public sphere. Positions and arguments set out within this

analysis challenge the current terms of reference of both policy focus and acculturation accounts, which approach integration in terms of the imperatives on the migrant to engage in one-way integration into a social undifferentiated dominant group.

Evidently public in Edinburgh and Stockholm readily understand integration in the form of the assimilationist acculturation strategies discussed by Berry (2006). But equally as shown here there are a number of new perceptions, for example, the idea of a hosting position that are worthy of further analysis. Migrants who are fully aware of the pressures to integrate, engage in a dialogue with assimiliationist arguments, and point to the importance of holding on to one's identities as central to developing conceptualizations of integration.

A further site for fruitful research is those processes by which returnee nonmigrants, in position 4 on the continuum, draw from their experiences of being in an outsider position to diffuse and resist the integration ideal. More generally this case study demonstrates, therefore, the value of including nonmigrants in research that aims to understand integration processes and integration policies. Such nonmigrants when discussing integration suggest that separation within a diverse society is not necessarily problematic or transgressive but perhaps a reasonable acculturation strategy.

The analysis and its framing demonstrates how members of the public and policy actors use a *social representation of cohesion* that has become hegemonic to the point that for many it is an unquestioned common sense. Within this social representation, integration becomes constructed as a requirement to reduce cultural distance. Use of the dominant national language is taken as a form of shared citizenship and a totemic outward expression of cohesion. The difficulty with this is those who resist this shared social representation, and emphasize a potentially equally cohesive *social representation of diversity* risk being positioned as transgressive (Bowskill et al. 2007). Actions such as the creative development of a transcultural language, in the Swedish context, or children socializing with their own ethnic group at school in the Scottish context run the risk of being viewed as an obstacle to integration, a sign of dissidence.

It is the existence of a social representation of cohesion that presents separation as a site of risk and conflict, rather than a form of convivial diversity, which perhaps has led to multiculturalism becoming understood as a struggle or a threat within European contexts. Thus the moral privileging of integration as assimilation noted by Bowskill et al. (2007) in England and McPherson (2010) in Australia is shown to occur within the two city contexts of Edinburgh and Stockholm.

A paradoxical feature of integration is that it necessarily constructs a problem migrant where ethno-religious difference, for example, a perceived difference between Muslims and other groups, is conflated with mobility and made salient. Some migrants in the study did not imagine that integration policies related to them. This assumption is not unreasonable when one begins to analyze such talk against the terms of reference of current integration polices outlined in the first part of this chapter. It is not so much that the migrants who took part in this study were not originally non-EU nationals, or facing integration challenges or insecurities in relation to their citizenship status—some of them were. It is that such migrants did not identify as the "problem" migrants they believed integration policies across Europe were attempting to tackle. This exploratory case study begins to delineate the variety of perceptions and arguments that exists on integration within these two city contexts. It points to the fact that a fuller appreciation of integration and public perceptions of integration requires further research to examine how ethno-cultural category intersects with socioeconomic position and mobility.

## Conclusion

In this chapter a dialogical analysis has been presented that shows that participants, when discussing features of integration, spoke not as migrants or nonmigrants but constructed several *I*-positions along a *10-point migration-mobility continuum*. The chapter demonstrates differences in the construction and enactment of integration related to position on the continuum from settled nonmigrants to serial migrants. While nonmigrants are revealed to be heterogeneous in their perceptions of integration, use of the dominant national language is viewed as pivotal across the continuum, suggesting a rise in assimilationist understandings of integration. Integration, as conformity, is today constructed, reified, and idealized as a panacea for social cohesion where inherent, paradoxically to the concept, is the construction of a problem migrant. The analysis presented here suggests that a promising challenge for new understandings of integration centers on an examination of the common-sense understandings of the relationship between diversity and social cohesion.

## Notes

1. The case study extracts are presented as they are recorded, including the irregularities of speech, to indicate the halting nature of speech and the thought processes involved. The case study transcriptions uses some Jefferson

conventions including ** to denote laughing, (3) to indicate time taken before speaking, = when two people speak at the same time and (. . .) to denote that some of the transcript has been removed.

2. All participants were made anonymous and contextualized as follows; by city whether they were migrant or nonmigrant; interview number and two anonymous initials.
3. Nicola Magnusson, a researcher on the D-MIC project, conducted the Swedish interviews and focus groups where participants had indicated a preference to speak Swedish.
4. The origins of the term "blatte" are contested, but it is likely to be connected to the Gaelic term "blether" and has come to be associated with the transcultural street talk of certain ethnic minority groups within Sweden. Often used as a pejorative term, it has been appropriated by some groups, for example, the Blatte Deluxe journalism award and the Blatte United football team in Stockholm.
5. Responses to question F24: Why in your view has integration become a political issue? (Enligt din åsikt, varför har integration av invandrare blivit en politisk sak?)